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. ,-f-+ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 2 assrstmg mnocent crvrhans. Thts mherent tension should gtve pause to U.S mihtary leaders, whose new vision for the future mcludes the abihty to dommate nuhtary operations involving humamtarxtn assistance as part of "full spectrum dominance" (Jomt Cluefs 17) A Massive Em ergencv. and the Preadent Resnonds Some 500,000 to gOO,OOO refugees fled from Rwanda mto Zaire m July 1994 Iniual estnnates at the tune were as high as 1.2 milhon people in the penod July 14-17 Thrs sudden and massrve outflow of refugees overwhelmed the abrhty of relief agencies to provide water, food, me&Cal care, shelter and other relief items (Goma Group, 339) On July 15 m Geneva, Swrtzerlami, the U.N. Hrgh Comrmss ioner for Refugees, Mis Sadako Ogata, addressed an emergency meetmg of the Humanitarian Liarson Working Group (HLWG, consisting of 24 donor governments and the European Commissnm) to alert the assembled ambassadors of the unpendmg disaster and to explain that she soon would be calling on governments for spectic assrstance By July 20, UNHCR had hastily put together a hst of erght self&mtamed (and ill-defied) "servrce packages." High Commtssroner Ogata requested that donor governments provtde the specrfie 4 assrstance as m-kmd contrrbutrons Many of the packages were geared to the kinds of operatrons whtch could be accomphshed by mihtary establishments arrport servrces, logtsucs base servrces, road servrcing and road securrty, site preparatton for refugee camps, provisron of dome&c fuel for cookmg, samtatron facilues, water management, and arrhead management <tR\JH+ memo 2-4)
The U S. Government was quack to respond StafT, told the commrttee that the mihtary effort would last until November or December "We are puttmg into place a logtsttcs network that ti take us a full month or so to put mto place, and then we expeh to sustam it at least for three or four months" (U S. Senate 28)
al Mihtary Reluctance
Official Executtve branch pronouncements of support for the humamtarian operation fmasked serious mrsg-tvmgs on the part of the U.S mihtary Accordmg to a semor government official / 4" olved m the effort, It was clear from the beginnmg the JCS was not a wrllmg par&pant. If they had I their "druthers," they wouldn't have been mvolved m the effort at all DOD, specrfically JCS, were "naysayers" who didn't want to do It. That's why Tony mattonal Security Adviser Anthony Lake] got the President mvolved JCS had been puttmg up roadblocks not to engage m any way (Semor official).
Such concerns became pubhc after the Chanman of the Joint Chrefs of Staff General John
Shahkashvih, met wrth reporters on July 28 He was quoted as saying, "We have a capacity l&e almost no one else to help wrth tragedies of a magmtude like we're wrtnessmg now m Rwanda
But we also at the same time need to strengthen the Umted Nauons so they can do more on then fown wi@out always having to call upon us or we don't have to play as large a part." (Graham A29 . . c--MlllwDe bate over U.S. Commttment During the height of the rehef effort, frequent mtemational consultauons were held on the pohucal, econonuc, military and humamtarian aspects of the Rwanda crrsrs On -4ugust 2, an mtematronal donors pledgmg conference was held at the United Nauons m Geneva In hrs speech, Richard McCall, head of the U S. delegatron and chief of staff to the USAID ,4dmmrstrator, described the mtematronal rehef effort and the U S acuons "to implement four of the erght servrce packages requested " He mentioned the request to Congress for supplemental appropnauons and noted that "much of thrs wrll be used to contmue managmg the four servrce packages on behalf of Our water production is now at the pomt where it 1s exceedmg consumpuon" (Vogel A12).
Remforcement of this view came f&n discussrons wrth UNHCR officers on the scene, who n apparently were not always m full agreement wrth then headquarters The official UYHCR vtew was strikingly different On August 11, Deputy Hrgh Commrssroner for Refugees Gerald Walzer wrote to the U S Ambassador to Intematronal Orgamzahons m Geneva to explant that much more needed to be done "Substanual support wrll be needed m the water sector until production goals are achteved m all areas and drstrrbution systems are fully estabhshed and sustamable" (Walzer).
by mid-August, rt was increasmgly clear that orgamzatronal perspectrves on the relief operahon m eastern Zarre differed dramahcally between the Department of Defense on one snie I and the Department of State and the Agency for b&mahonal Development on the other Prom the mihtary perspecttve, the worst was over and rt would soon be trme for an expedihous transfer to rehef agencies In mrd-July, Zaire had wrtnessed one of the worst humamtarran crrses nuagmable-up to 800,000 refugees had crossed the border m the course of .@--I four days and arrrved m a remote area of volcamc rock with msufficrent water and food, almost 50,000 refugees (between srx and ten percent) dted durmg the tit month after the mflux By the second month, however, "a well-coordinated rehef programme was assocrated wnh a steep FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 8 declme ul death rates" to one-fourth of the earlier level (Goma Group, 339-342) The US mrhtary, wrth rts unmatched logtstical capabihty, had proMded the necessary surge capacity whtch intemahonal rehef agencies lacked for a crisis on such a massive scale As one mrlitary officer mvolved m the operahon put it, once the dymg stopped and the mfiastructure was estabhshed, "our mission was over" and resources which had been diverted to Gperahon Support Hope could be apphed to "more appropriate tasks " In his view, "the military ddrft perceive thts as a true mtssron" because there was no secunty factor mvolved, as there was m Somaha or Hah (Jomt stafFof&r)
The civdnn agencles, however, had a d&rent outlook They were accustomed to dealmg wrth refugee and migration crises, but thrs was one of the worst in hrstory It seemed less and less hkely that the refugees (prnn@ Hutus) would return to Rwanda anybme soon. Extrenusts, many of whom had committed genocide, were hvmg in the refugee camps Meanwhrle, Rwanda rtself had been devastated by the horn& genocide and the government takeover by the Rwandan Patriohc Front (led by Tut@. The prospects for further con&et appeared to be htgh Durmg the second month of the crtsis, five to erght refugees out of every 10,000 were dymg each day, and this was still way above the crude mortality rate (0.6 per 10,000 per &y) in Rwanda pnor to the confhct (Goma Group 340) Thus, from the perspectrve of State and USAID (and many NGOs), this lookbd to be a long-term situahon requnmg large-scale humanitarian and development resources and an extraordinary commttment on the part of the mtemahonal community Thrs context made it even more important that the U S. Government meet its July pohcy comnutment to pro&e four of the "servtce packages" requested by UNHCR As to the cntical water package, 
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These surroundmg events affected those concerned w&h Rwandan refugee rehef From the Pentagon's perspective, it was important that Operahon Support Hope be a success after the failure m Somalia. At the same ume, there was to be no Somaha-style expansion of the mrssron The humanitanan relief effort, which took place in a secure envrronment, had a lower prior@ m the Pentagon than the planned invasion of Haiu, which was potenhahy far more dangerous
Many of the cn&ns, meanwhile, were greatly affected by the fact that the U S. --The service package concept, rf more clearly defined and in more manageable sizes, can be usefully employed agam Refined service packages should allow both larger and smaller nnlitary establtsbments to assume some of the tasks requrred -The use of hoops for direct delivery of suppltes 1s often conhoversral, expensive and full of pobtical comphcahons If used, there sbould always be a sh-ategy to ensure their departure as soon as the situahon pernuts --The mibtary's mvolvement should be used to leverage the parhcipahon of relief orgamzahons (e g., airlift to bung m equipment belonging to rebef orgamzahons).
--Umty of effort should be acbteved through improved coordmation, especrally m sharmg "real hme" mfomtahon and sethng ptiorrhes. Fe 1994 experience with Rwandan refugees, however, calls mto queshon the prospects for effecttve implementatton of this vlslon The mthtary will need far more than "focused logtshcs"
(Jomt Chiefs 18) to be fLlly successful when it is selecttvely engaged in provlding humamtanan aid It will requrre stronger commitment from tts leadership, stronger support in Congress, and closer cooperation with cn&an agencies on both the nature and termmation of its humanitarian nusston Nevertheless, even under the best of cn-cumstances, the concept of dommance m Jomt Vision 2010 will be diEcult to achieve The nature of the United States mihtary, with its focus on warlighbng, means that humanitarian asststance will always be viewed as a secondary concern and as a distrachon from the real task at hand. Thts will mevnably result m clashes with the civilian 
